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Contradictory information flow in networks
with trust and distrust
Giuseppe Primiero and Michele Bottone and Franco Raimondi and Jacopo
Tagliabue
Abstract We offer a proof system and a NetLogo simulation for trust and distrust
in networks where contradictory information is shared by ranked lazy and sceptic
agents. Trust and its negative are defined as properties of edges: the former is re-
quired when a message is passed bottom-up in the hierarchy or received by a scep-
tic agent; the latter is attributed to channels that require contradiction resolution,
or whose terminal is a lazy agent. These procedures are associated with epistemic
costs, respectively for confirmation and refutation. We describe the logic, illustrate
the algorithms implemented in the model and then focus on experimental results
concerning the analysis of epistemic costs, the role of the agents’ epistemic attitude
on distrust distribution and the influence of (dis)trust in reaching consensus.
1 Introduction
Trust of information transmissions facilitates reliability and enforces security in net-
works. This applies in particular to hierarchical structures, e.g. in access control
models [3, 2, 14], and where reputation is at work, e.g. in social networks [9, 18, 4].
Trust and distrust on communication channels are also affected by the agents’ epis-
Giuseppe Primiero
Department of Computer Science, Middlesex University London, e-mail: G.Primiero@mdx.ac.uk
Michele Bottone
Department of Computer Science, Middlesex University London, e-mail: M.Bottone@mdx.ac.uk
Franco Raimondi
Department of Computer Science, Middlesex University London, e-mail: F.Raimondi@mdx.ac.uk
Jacopo Tagliabue
AXON VIBE, New York, e-mail: tagliabue.jacopo@gmail.com
Preprint of a Paper to appear in H. Cherifi, S. Gaito, W. Quattrociocchi, A. Sala (eds.), Complex
Networks & Their Applications V, Studies in Computational Intelligence, Springer, forthcoming.
1
2 Giuseppe Primiero and Michele Bottone and Franco Raimondi and Jacopo Tagliabue
temic attitude, their ability and willingness to check information and their readiness
to reject it. Negative trust has recently become a topic of interest in computational
contexts [13, 11]. In particular, understanding conditions of (dis)trust propagation
and the costs related to topological and epistemic factors is crucial for dynamic (so-
cial) network analysis and access control models [1, 6, 21, 8], with applications in
mathematics, computer science, economics and biology. Negative accounts of trust
are essential especially for networks that allow contradictory information diffusion
but require coherent agents.
In this paper we offer a logic and a NetLogo simulation for networks with con-
tradictory information and where agents identify their channels as trustful or dis-
trustful. Our agents are qualified as sceptic or lazy and are given an initial ranking
depending on the topological features of the network. The network is seeded ini-
tially with two items of contradictory information (p,¬p). Each node is labelled by
either piece of data, with a resolution procedure when both are received by the same
node. At each step, the node assigns a trust or a distrust property to the relevant
edge. In our experimental analysis we consider in particular:
1. the epistemic costs of trust and distrust according to different network topologies;
2. the distrust distribution in view of the epistemic attitude of the seeding agents;
3. the role of distrust in reaching consensus.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we overview related work. In Sec-
tion 3 we introduce the calculus (Un)SecureNDsim which includes rules for trust
and distrust. In Section 4 we provide the principles underlying the graph construc-
tion and algorithm design at the basis of the simulation. In Section 5 we describe
our experimental results. Finally, Section 6 presents general observations on our
analysis and shortly illustrates future work.
2 Related Work
In reporting on previous work, we focus in particular on three different aspects:
controversial users vs. controversial trust values; binary and continuous trust values;
local vs. global trust methods.
In [12] controversial users are those generating a disagreement on their trustwor-
thiness, either as the minimum between trust and distrust evaluations by other users,
or as the difference in the number of trust and distrust judgements. [20] considers
instead controversial trust values between two nodes, determined either as the trust
weight of their edge, or as a fixed negative value when no path exists, or as a con-
tinuous value t ∈ [0,1] when there is no direct edge. Similarly, in our logic trust is a
function on formulas obtained by verification, mimicked in the network model by a
property of edges when a node is labelled.
Differently from the above, our model uses discrete values but it combines the
comparative ranking of agents with both their epistemic attitudes and a majority
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selection in the case of conflicting information. [12] also uses a binary classifica-
tion for users, so do several models for belief diffusion in social networks, with bi-
nary opinions for agents, considering neighbours’ influence [5, 9] or majority ([18]).
Continuous models, on the other hand, might depend on the weight of other agents’
opinion [10] or admit influence only below a certain distance [7].
Trust defined by global methods is a value attached to a user and appropriate for
a reputation evaluation at network level; in local methods, trust is inferred instead as
a value between source and sink nodes, i.e. it is an edge feature. As it appears clearly
from the above, our approach uses a local trust method in the case of non-conflicting
information, resorting to a computation of trust path lengths to determine which ele-
ments need to be distrusted in the case of conflicting information. This combination
of features recalls the two controversial cases discussed in [20]: the ToTrustOrNot-
ToTrust case resembles our binary choice, but moderated by continuous trust values,
while we rely on ranking and epistemic attitudes; the Asymmetric Controversy case
resorts to path lengths with preference for shortest paths, while we base our result
on the number of distrustful edges present in each path.
To the best of our knowledge, no other work in the current literature combines
a rule-based semantics with ranked agents with epistemic attitude, using local trust
values with path length analysis for the resolution of contradictory information.
3 (Un)SecureNDsim
The natural deduction calculus SecureND [16] is a logic designed for secure oper-
ations on resources issued by subjects with different privileges; it guarantees trusted
content checked for consistency at every transmission. (Un)SecureND [15] is an
extension with negation to model two forms of negative trust. In [17], the calcu-
lus SecureNDsim is adapted to model contradictory information propagation under
trust in a network of ranked agents and is simulated in NetLogo [19]. In this contri-
bution we present (Un)SecureNDsim, extending the previous system to deal with
a distrust function. We refer to a set of agents as V and an individual agent as vi.
Agents behave differently in the context of information transmission:
• sceptic agents and agents reading from below in the hierarchy require verification
when receiving a message, and as a result they trust the related channel;
• lazy agents and all agents in the presence of contradictions have a rejection atti-
tude, with the result of distrusting the related channel.
Verification and rejection are computationally costly processes for the agents and
these costs are tracked in our model.
Definition 1. The syntax of (Un)SecureNDsim is defined by the following alphabet:
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V := {lazy(vi),sceptic(vi)}
BFV := pvi | ¬pvi
mode := Read(BFV ) |Veri f y(BFV ) |Write(BFV ) | Trust(BFV ) | DisTrust(BFV )
RESV := BFV | mode | ¬RESV
ΓV := {φ vi1 , . . . ,φ vin };
V is the set containing lazy and sceptic agents; BFV are literals, i.e. atoms and their
negations; in the following, when needing a metavariable for either, we will use φV ;
mode is for access functions over atoms; RESV includes both contents and access
modes, with negation. In line with standard notation for natural deduction, we use
ΓV to express a context of expressions (typed by one agent in V , and feasible to
extension to another agent’s context) in which a given formula is derivable: such a
context matches the graph G of agents introduced in the next section; the derived
formula matches a new labelled vertex added to the graph. Formulas of this language
are of the general form Γ vi ` RES(φ v j), saying that an agent vi accesses under her
profile a message φ originated by agent v j. Access is here neutral for all the op-
erations included in mode. An order relation ≤ over V ×V models the dominance
relation between agents: vi ≤ v j means that agent vi has equal or higher priority (e.g.
in terms of security privileges) than agent v j.
The rules system (Un)SecureNDsim is introduced in Figure 1 and it assumes
that vi≤ v j holds. This logic allows the following operations. Any content is accessi-
ble within a well-formed (w f ) user profile (Atom). Accessing a negation of a content
implies that the contrary cannot be accessed (¬-distribution): this is a strong nega-
tion rule, justifying the resolution procedure for contradictions. Any content can be
read from agents downwards in the order relation (read down) and it is accepted
if it preserves the profile consistency (read elim). Reading by an agent upwards in
the dominance relation or by a sceptic agent is possible by invoking a verification
procedure (verify high and verify sceptic respectively). Such verification checks
consistency and then applies a trust function on the object of the message (trust).
Reading and trusting guarantee rights to write formulae (write trust). The remain-
ing rules define the behaviour of distrust relations. Reading contradictory informa-
tion or reading by a lazy agent induce a rejection procedure (unverified contra and
unverified lazy respectively). This in turn means that a distrust operation is executed
(distrust), and the opposite message to the one read can be written (distrust elim).
4 Model Design and Implementation
The network is an undirected graph G = (V,E), with a set V = {vi, . . . ,vn} of ver-
tices (agents) and a set E = {e(i, j), . . . ,e(n,m)} of edges (information transmission
channels). A labelled node v(p) denotes an agent knowing p; v(¬p) denotes an
agent knowing ¬p; v() is used for a vertex with no label and denotes an agent who
does not hold any knowledge yet. An edge between two nodes is fully denoted by
e(vi(),v j()) with the appropriate labels: e(vi(p),v j()) expresses a channel from i
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Γ vi ` w f
AtomΓ vi ;Γ v j ` φ v j
Γ vi ` mode(¬φ v j ) ¬-distribution
Γ vi ` ¬mode(φ v j )
Γ v j ` w f Γ vi ` φ vi
read down
Γ vi ;Γ v j ` Read(φ vi )
Γ vi ;Γ v j ` Read(φ vi ) Γ v j ;φ vi ` w f
read elimΓ v j ` φ v j
Γ vi ` Read(φ v j )
verify high
Γ vi `Veri f y(φ v j )
Γ vi ` φ vi v j ∈ sceptic node
verify sceptic
Γ v j `Veri f y(φ vi )
Γ vi `Veri f y(φ v j ) Γ vi ;φ v j ` w f
trust
Γ vi ` Trust(φ v j )
Γ vi ` Read(φ v j ) Γ vi ` Trust(φ v j )
write trust
Γ vi `Write(φ v j )
Γ vi ` φ vi Γ vi ` Read(¬φ j)
unverified contra
Γ vi ` ¬Veri f y(¬φ v j )
Γ vi ` Read(φ v j ) vi ∈ lazy node
unverified lazy
Γ vi ` ¬Veri f y(φ v j )
Γ vi ` ¬Veri f y(φ v j )
distrust
Γ vi ` DisTrust(φ v j )
Γ vi ` DisTrust(φ v j )
distrust elim
Γ vi `Write(¬φ v j )
Fig. 1 The system (Un)SecureNDsim
to j such that the former can transmit p over. A non-standard notation with three
nodes e(vi(p),v j(),vk(¬p)) is used to abbreviate the fact that the following edges
exist: e(vi(p),v j()) and e(v j(),vk(¬p)) and it requires a resolution procedure. When
need for reference to multiple vertexes arises, we shall use the notation vi,...n. The
order relation among nodes is total or partial in view of the network topology. In a
total network, each vertex has an edge connecting it to any other vertex and all have
equal ranking; the underlying dominance relation is then a total order. In the linear
network, each vertex has an edge to the next vertex higher in the ranking; by tran-
sitivity, also this order is total. In the random network, by introducing a new node
at least one edge with another vertex is established; the ranking is here assigned by
the seeding node and never overwritten, the order is partial. The scale-free network
model uses the Barabasi-Albert method: it is initialised by m = 3 nodes and each
node v j without neighbours is connected to up to n < m existing vertices with a
probability pv j =
kv j
∑vi kvi
, where kv j is the number of neighbours of agent v j and the
sum is made over all pre-existing nodes vi. Newly added nodes tend to prefer nodes
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1 PROCEDURE Transmission(G), with φ ∈ BFV
2
3 G := (V,E)
4
5 FOR e(vi(φ),v j()) ∈ G
6 IF v j() ∈ sceptic OR ranking(v j())< ranking(vi(φ))
7 THEN Verify(e(vi(φ),v j())) AND G′ := G∪ (v j(φ))
8 ELSEIF v j() ∈ lazy
9 THEN Distrust(e(vi(φ),v j())) AND G′ := G∪ (v j(¬φ))
10 ENDIFELSE
11 ENDFOR
12
13 FOR e(vi(φ),v j(),vk(¬φ)) ∈ G
14 SolveConflict(e(vi(φ),v j(),vk(¬φ)))
15
16 RETURN Trusted(G)
17 ENDPROCEDURE
Fig. 2 Algorithm for Simple Information Transmission
1 PROCEDURE Verify(e(vi(φ),v j()))
2
3 set COSTTRUST+1
4 set TRUSTLINK e(vi(φ),v j(φ))
5 RETURN Trusted(G)
6 ENDPROCEDURE
Fig. 3 Algorithm for Trust Costs Increase
that already have a high number of links. The ranking in this case is given as 1|edges| .
The maximum number of vertices in our graphs is set at 300.
The randomly seeded contradictory information (p,¬p) flows in the network,
according to the algorithm Transmission in Figure 2. If the receiving agent is
sceptic or a non-contradictory message comes from below in the dominance re-
lation, a successful transmission is preceded by a sub-routine Verify, described in
Figure 3. The latter implies an epistemic cost, the new node is successfully labelled
and the edge is qualified as trusted. If the receiving agent is lazy, a new subroutine
Distrust is executed, by which the edge is qualified as distrusted and the related
epistemic costs are increased, Figure 4. A node receiving contradictory data (p,¬p)
starts a resolution process SolveConflict, see Figure 5: it analyses the number
of distrusted links appended to each neighbour with each contradictory piece of in-
formation and it selects the new label from the least distrusted one, proceeding by
random choice (∗) when an equal number of distrusted links is detected. It then
executes the subroutine Distrust on the selected link.
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1 PROCEDURE Distrust(e(vi(φ),v j()))
2
3 set COSTDISTRUST+1
4 set DISTRUSTLINK e(vi(φ),v j(¬φ))
5 RETURN Trusted(G)
6 ENDPROCEDURE
Fig. 4 Algorithm for Distrust Costs Increase
1 PROCEDURE SolveConflict(e(vi(φ),v j(),vk(¬φ)))
2
3 let d1 #DISTRUSTLINK e(vi,...n(φ),v j())
4 let d2 #DISTRUSTLINK e(vk,...m(¬φ),v j())
5
6 IF ( length d1 > length d2)
7 THEN G′ := G∪ (v j(¬φ)) AND Distrust(e(vi(φ),v j(¬φ)))
8 ENDIF
9
10 IF ( length d1 < length d2)
11 THEN G′ := G∪ (v j(φ)) AND Distrust(e(vk(¬φ),v j(φ)))
12 ENDIF
13
14 IF ( length d1 = length d2)
15 IF ∗
16 THEN G′ := G∪ (v j(¬φ)) AND Distrust(e(vi(φ),v j(¬φ)))
17 ELSE G′ := G∪ (v j(φ)) AND Distrust(e(vk(¬φ),v j(φ)))
18 ENDIFELSE
19 ENDIF
20 ENDPROCEDURE
Fig. 5 Algorithm for Conflict Resolution
5 Experimental results
The code for the simulation and all data from the experiments are available at
https://bitbucket.org/gprimiero/cn16. The experiments have been executed on a ma-
chine with 7.7 GB of memory, 64bit Ubuntu 16.04 system, NetLogo 5.3. We have
collected data from several synthetic networks of fixed dimensions between 10 and
300 nodes, with seeding of labels (p,¬p) randomly associated to two sceptic/lazy
nodes. We consider first different network topologies and then focus on scale-free
networks only, which better represent the topology of complex graphs as they oc-
cur for example in social networks. On the other hand, linear networks are more
common in hierarchical structures that can be encountered in conditions of access
control. In both cases, the role of trust and distrust operation is crucial to information
propagation.
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Trust in total networks
Trust in linear networks
Trust in random networks
Trust in scale-free networks
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Trust Costs
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 100
Runs
Average Average
Trusted Links Trust Cost
Random 47.78 940.92
Linear 77.78 434.16
Scale-free 102.21 415.42
Total 971.44 385.11
Fig. 6 Trust distribution and average costs
5.1 Costs of Trust/Distrust by Network Topology
In the first run of experiments we compare different network topologies of fixed
size (300 nodes), each equipped with a fixed proportion of sceptic nodes (50%). We
consider in particular the size of trusted and distrusted edges and the related costs
for each topology.
As shown in Figure 6 and the associated Table, the average rate of links and costs
is inversely proportional: the former increases from random, through linear, scale-
free and total networks, while the latter decreases. Given the fixed number of sceptic
agents across the various topologies, the decrease in costs should be mainly associ-
ated with the ranking of agents and their order, while the increase in trusted links
is purely due to the number of links in the network. From these data it appears that
random networks perform the worst, as the required costs are high but the obtained
links are less than in scale-free or linear networks.
The different topologies show a similar pattern with respect to distrust values.
As shown in Figure 7 and the associated Table of average values, random networks
are the most expensive with respect to distrust, and have the lowest number of dis-
trusted links; linear networks remain constrained in number of distrusted links, with
costs decreasing; scale-free networks do not show a sensibly better behaviour, with
comparable number of distrusted links and costs; finally, total networks perform the
best, with the highest levels of links and relatively lower costs. As shown in the
graph, it is remarkable the diverging behaviours of total and random networks: the
former ones have almost stable distrust cost with increasing distrusted links, while
the latter have stable links with increasing costs.
The comparison between tables shows that the average number of trusted and
distrusted links grows in parallel, while the related costs decrease in a similar vein
across the different topologies. Trust propagates a lot more than distrust in these
balanced networks, suggesting that the former is a more frequent and more relevant
property in information transmission than the latter.
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Distrust in total networks
Distrust in linear networks
Distrust in random networks
Distrust in scale-free networks
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Distrust Links Distrust Cost
Random 35.4 167.38
Linear 71.82 130.18
Scale-free 75.29 134.5
Total 264.13 103.1
Fig. 7 Distrust distribution and average costs
5.2 Distrust and epistemic attitude
In this and the following experiments, we focus on scale-free networks only and
their distrust behaviour.1 First, we consider distrust as a parameter of the proportion
of lazy agents in a network of 300 nodes, with a random assignment of seeds to
agents. As shown in Figure 8, there is a strict correlation between the proportion of
sceptic and the distrust behaviour: the more lazy agents are present in the network,
the higher its overall distrust value. While this is obvious in view of the algorithm
design, it is interesting to remark that in the case of a fully sceptic network (where
no lazy agents are allowed), the value of distrust is to be associated entirely with the
presence of contradictory information, and hence it can be used as a parameter of
contradiction diffusion. The associated Table offers average values over 100 runs. It
illustrates that conflict resolution is responsible on average for roughly 10% of the
network’s distrusted edges, with costs averaging at around 17 of those of a highly
lazy network (i.e. with 10% of sceptic agents).
Distrust in SW networks parametric to sceptic proportion
 0
 200
 400
 600Av. Distrust Links  0
 200
 400
Av. Distrust Costs
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
% Sceptic
% Sceptics Av. Distrusted Av. Distrust
Links Cost
10% 575.45 350.92
30% 170.11 276.79
50% 129.98 213.36
80% 69.2 113.83
100% 32.25 45.35
Fig. 8 Distrust behaviour and epistemic attitude.
1 For a more detailed analysis of further aspects of trust behaviour, see [17].
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Fig. 9 Initial nodes’ epistemic attitudes and distrust
We now extract the values for a balanced network (i.e. with 50% of sceptic
agents) and compare them to the initial distribution of seeds qualified as lazy-sceptic
agents. As Figure 9 shows, there is a strict correlation of the final distribution of dis-
trust values with the initial condition of the network: the range of minimal values
for both distrust costs and number of distrusted links is relatively stable, while their
maximum values decreases when moving from a configuration that has two sceptic
agents as initial nodes to one that has two lazy ones. The result on distrust across
the network is less influenced by the role of agents distributing the information than
by the role of agents receiving it.
5.3 Trust, Distrust and consensus
Our last experiment concerns the role of trust and distrust in reaching consensus.
As shown in Figure 10, networks with trust and distrust present an inverse correla-
tion between size and the number of transmissions that reach consensus: the smaller
the network, more often full labelling with a unique formula is obtained (i.e. it is
easier to reach consensus). Despite some differences in the reached peaks by lazy
and balanced networks, the behaviour is overall similar in all configurations: bal-
anced networks have the highest absolute number of such runs, while networks with
higher proportion of sceptic agents have the lowest number of consensus reaching
transmissions. Networks with distrust significantly differ from those with trust only
for the total amount of consensus-reaching transmissions. We show this for balanced
networks in the second graph of Figure 10, the same holding for lazy and sceptic
networks: the presence of a distrust routine has a strong impact on the ability of the
network to reach consensus in the presence of contradictory information, with no
more than 9% of runs reaching a full labelling by either p or ¬p (network of 40
nodes), while in the case of networks with trust only, this value reaches 63% (for
networks of the same size).
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Fig. 10 Consensus in Scale-free Networks with distrust
6 Conclusions
We have presented a logic for the analysis of distrust propagation in a multi-agent
system. We have offered related algorithms and an agent-based simulation of the
dynamics of such networks when transmitting contradictory information. Our ini-
tial experimental results, currently limited to synthetic networks and to be extended
with real-world larger data sets, show that: distrust has a lower impact on informa-
tion transmission in terms of costs than trust; it represents a strong obstacle to reach-
ing consensus; and it qualifies up to a tenth of the size of the network in the presence
of contradictory information. Further research will offer extensive comparison with
other models, updates of epistemic attitudes and applications to swarm-like phe-
nomena.
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